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INTRODUCTION
Research on the historical evolution of corporate gover-
nance in the UK is still at an early stage [Toms and Wilson,
2003, pp.3-4]. While there is a growing literature on this topic
[Keasey et al., 1997; Hopt et al., 1998; Cheffins, 2001; Toms and
Wright, 2002] it is generally the case that such discussions are
not informed by detailed empirical evidence.1 There are, how-
ever, some exceptions. An appreciation of the significance of
governance to industrial administration, within a French con-
text, was demonstrated in 1916 by Henri Fayol [1949] though it
has been argued that subsequent (English) writers blurred the
distinction between management and governance [Tricker,
1984, p.280] and thus the subject remained obscure in the En-
glish speaking world of business. Writing in 1984, Tricker ar-
gued that in Britain interest in the issue of corporate governance
appeared to be of recent origin: “In the past there seemed little
challenge to management’s prerogative to run the company un-
impeded, no demand for independent supervision or disclosure,
no intervention in matters of accountability, no questioning of
corporate power and legitimacy, little interest in involvement or
participation in management decisions” [1984, p.5]. More re-
cently, Sheikh and Chatterjee have argued that despite corporate
governance being a well recognized concept in Australia, New
Zealand, the USA and some European countries, “it has received
hardly any attention in the UK, primarily because of the tradi-
tional view maintained by the (corporate governance) system
that directors are to maximise profits for their shareholders, as
the interests of the latter are paramount to directors” [1995,
p.1].
Maclean [1999] has suggested that business historians are
well placed to contribute to the contemporary debate on corpo-
rate governance. The long-standing concerns of business histori-
ans implicitly if not explicitly pertain to such issues. Indeed,
issues such as board selection, board performance, family con-
trol, shareholder maneuvering, and the influence and regenera-
tive potential of business elites, are all topics which might profit
from systematic, closely documented, historical enquiry. Yet,
Maclean argues, few of the voluminous company histories one
might consult in expectation take up such themes. Nor are the
pages of business/accountancy history journals replete with ar-
ticles which inform the heated debate on corporate governance
1 See, however the work of Quail [2000].
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currently raging across the world [Maclean, 1999, p.109]. An
important exception has been the work of John Quail who has
argued that in the British case the “separate roles and preroga-
tives of the directors . . . led to a fixity of structure” which acted
to limit the evolution of “managerial hierarchies beyond the de-
partmental or functional level” and also restricted the growth of
firms “beyond a certain size or complexity of operation” [Quail,
2000, p.2]. While there has been some recent response to this
call for further research, as O’Sullivan has argued, “more em-
pirical research is required to understand the institutions of cor-
porate governance as they have emerged in different countries
and as they have evolved and continue to change over time”
[2000, p. 295]. Further, O’Sullivan argues that in the literature
on corporate governance, the treatment of these issues has been
too superficial, partly because much of the empirical analysis of
systems of corporate governance has not been sufficiently his-
torical or comparative. A central aim of this paper is to begin to
address this shortcoming by reporting the results of an histori-
cal investigation of the governance system of an important, in-
ternationally recognized British engineering firm, Birmingham
Small Arms.
DEFINING CORPORATE GOVERNANCE:
THEORY AND METHODOLOGY
The empirical work of accounting and business historians is
not conducted in a vacuum, and the approach in this paper is
informed by a theoretical framework that is embedded in the
institutional arrangements of corporate governance. Corporate
governance is taken to mean a concern “with the institutions
that influence how business corporations allocate resources and
returns. Specifically a system of corporate governance shapes
who makes investment decisions in a corporation, what type of
decision they make, and how returns from investments are dis-
tributed” [O’Sullivan, 2000, p.1]. In addition corporate gover-
nance is concerned with the form, extent and quality of disclo-
sure of ‘relevant’ business and financial information and the
means by which directors project, articulate and justify the
corporation’s role as a socio-business organization. Defined in
this way corporate governance is facilitated by the estab-
lishment of a system whereby directors are entrusted with re-
sponsibilities and duties in relation to the stewardship of a
company’s affairs. Based on a system of accountability an effec-
tive corporate governance system should provide mechanisms
3
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for regulating directors’ duties in order to restrain them from
abusing their powers and to ensure that they act in the best
interests of the company in its broadest sense [Sheikh and
Chatterjee, 1995, p.5].
Three important principles follow from the above discus-
sion. Firstly, there is a need to distinguish between the ‘manage-
ment’ of the company and its ‘governance’, whereby the latter “is
not concerned with running the business of the company per se,
but with the directors giving overall direction to the enterprise,
overseeing and controlling the executive actions of manage-
ment, and satisfying legitimate expectations for accountability
and regulation by interests beyond the corporate boundary”
[Sheikh and Chatterjee, 1995, p.6]. Secondly, this approach to
corporate governance allows considerable scope for an extensive
empirical study because it facilitates an analysis of actual gover-
nance systems and institutions. In the specific British context,
the historical evolution of corporate governance is closely re-
lated to the institutional arrangements of personal capitalism. In
the literature there is an important distinction between personal
and managerial capitalism [see Gourvish, 1987; Chandler, 1990;
Church, 1990, 1993, 1995; Supple, 1991; Lloyd-Jones and Lewis,
1994, 2000, 2003; Wilson, 1995; Quail, 2000]. Both these differ-
ent styles of capitalism represent forms of control over compa-
nies and are clearly linked to the issue of corporate governance.
The business historian, closely associated with the notion of
personal capitalism is A.D. Chandler jnr, who has asserted that
the persistence with personal forms of control shaped the gover-
nance of British manufacturing companies into the second half
of the 20th century [see Toms and Wilson, 2003, p.3]. Despite
the growing challenge to Chandler’s work [see Teece, 1993,
pp.199-225; Wilson, 1995; John, 1997, pp.151-200] it remains
the dominant paradigm [Toms and Wilson, 2003, p.3] and the
notion of personal capitalism is a useful means of trying to
understand the evolution of British business organization in the
20th century.
Thirdly, while the analysis of personal capitalist firms rec-
ognizes the importance of the development of common patterns
of governance, such an approach necessarily places considerable
emphasis on the idiosyncratic behavior of firms. It is because
firms are not simply a set of transactions but can (and clearly
do) build organizational capabilities not available on the market
(‘the way we do things here’!) [see Langlois and Robertson,
1995, ch.1] that they are idiosyncratic and consequently lend
themselves to the case study approach that remains one of the
4
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key methodological frameworks of accounting/business history.
This method of enquiry is also consistent with the specific his-
torical trajectory of business development. For example, as
Easterbrook and Fisher have pointed out, the permissiveness of
British company law in the first half of the 20th century means
that the firm can be seen as “a complex set of explicit and im-
plicit contracts” [quoted in Monks and Minow, 2001, p. 89]. This
requires a historical case study of corporate governance to look
at the specific behavior and relationships of the different parties
— directors, shareholders, finance providers, auditors — to the
contract and raises the notion of “strategic position”, which is
concerned with who has the power to make the key decisions
within a company [Herman, 1981, p.19]. It is also related to
Nelson’s proposition that what business organizations “can do
well has something of a life of its own” and this applies as much
to the firm’s governance system as it does to its other core capa-
bilities across the range of its business activities [1996, p.111].
In the following analysis, a wide definition of governance has
been adopted which enables engagement with the broader lit-
erature as well as the detailed empirical evidence at the level of
a firm.
THE CHOICE OF BSA AS A CASE STUDY
The case study explores the exercise of control and the man-
agement of conflict and concessions in an engineering company.
BSA was selected for four main reasons. Firstly, BSA was a long
established company. It was founded in 1861 and by the begin-
ning of the 20th century it had gained a national reputation for
the quality of its products. Secondly, it was a large company,
securing a place in Britain’s 100 largest manufacturing firms
throughout the period under study [see Johnson, 1990, pp. 20-
39; Shaw, 1990, pp. 11-12]. Thirdly, BSA was an innovative firm;
it produced a range of engineering products some of which, for
their time, were at the leading edge of technological develop-
ment (e.g. bicycles, motor cycles and motor cars). Fourthly, and
more importantly because it is directly related to corporate gov-
ernance, the composition of the BSA board 1906-1933 showed
different groups exercising control through what Herman has
referred to as “strategic position” [1981, pp. 26-28]. That is, their
status within the board gave them an authority and dominance
over the types of strategic decisions that were outlined by
O’Sullivan above. In particular a dominant group emerged fol-
lowing the company’s merger with Daimler in 1910 and main-
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tained control within the generic form of personal capitalism for
the next 20 years.
The case study examines three episodes that focus on the
struggle for control at BSA. The first is essentially concerned
with an insider/outsider conflict between directors and share-
holders, which was partially resolved by court action in 1906.
The second examines the change in board composition and the
consequence for the company’s governance brought by BSA’s
merger with Daimler in 1910. The third explores a protracted
dispute which extended over the 1920s and into the early 1930s
between the board and shareholder dissidents, two of whom
were ex-directors. The latter dispute only ended when reforms of
the company’s governance were apparently conceded, and there
was a change in the occupants of “strategic position” at BSA
when the firm experienced the leadership of four different chair-
men between 1928 and 1933.
SHAREHOLDER/DIRECTOR CONFLICT: NEWTON V BSA
The Newton v Birmingham Small Arms court case heard in
1906 attracted wide contemporary comment in the financial
press and continues to feature as a landmark. It was recognized
immediately as an important decision: The Accountant com-
mented that “It is some years since a legal decision has been
delivered of such far-reaching importance to the profession” [14
July 1906]. Two aspects of the case are of relevance to the
present paper: firstly, as an indication of the relationship be-
tween BSA directors and shareholders, and secondly, as a prece-
dent for financial reporting, and hence for corporate governance
in Great Britain for the next quarter-century. We argue that the
use of secret reserves was intended to extend directors’ control
over BSA’s assets by preventing shareholders from monitoring
the annual performance of the company. It was also a portent of
the increasing influence of Dudley Docker, who was to be in-
volved in a subsequent major episode, the merger of BSA and
Daimler.
The Court Case: At extraordinary meetings of the BSA sharehold-
ers in early 1906, the directors had passed a special resolution to
allow them to create an “internal reserve fund” out of profits,
which they could use for any purpose they thought fit. Transfers
into the fund might be made in any year in which the company
had paid a dividend of at least 10% on the ordinary shares and
had paid all preference dividends. The auditors were to be
6
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informed of this fund and any transfers to or from it, but they
were not to be permitted to disclose information about it to the
shareholders, and it was not to be disclosed separately in the
balance sheet. The result would be the creation of a fund about
which the shareholders were not entitled to be informed.
In June 1906, Sir Alfred Newton, a shareholder, applied for
an injunction to prevent the directors from implementing this
resolution. He argued that the directors were acting ultra vires,
exceeding their powers under company law and taking away the
right of shareholders to knowledge of “the true position of the
company” [Law Report 2 Chancery, 382, 1906]. He succeeded in
his challenge, but only on the grounds that the directors might
not prevent the auditors from making disclosures to sharehold-
ers. Buckley, the presiding judge, endorsed the acceptability of
internal or secret reserves. The creation of such reserves had the
effect of producing a balance sheet that would “shew the finan-
cial position . . . to be not as good as it in fact is. . . . (S)uch a
balance-sheet will not, in my judgement, be necessarily inconsis-
tent with the Act of Parliament” (the Companies Act, 1900) [Law
Report 2 Chancery, 387, 1906]. Buckley made the assertion,
which has frequently been quoted since, that “The purpose of
the balance-sheet is primarily to shew that the financial position
is at least as good as there stated, not to show that it is not or
may not be better” [Law Report 2 Chancery, 387, 1906]. Com-
pany law protected audit, but it did not impose detailed disclo-
sure obligations; it was up to shareholders and directors to
agree the terms of the contract between them as it affected fi-
nancial reporting.
Shareholders’ Resistance and Directors’ Victory: The directors of
BSA promptly responded by calling another extraordinary gen-
eral meeting to pass an altered resolution, identical to the previ-
ous one except that it did not place any restriction on the audi-
tors’ freedom to communicate with shareholders where it was
their duty to do so under the Companies Act 1900. Newton and
a number of his fellow-shareholders did their best to rally oppo-
sition, by letters to The Times, circulars to shareholders and
their behavior at meetings during the year following the court
case. At the meeting on 16 July 1906 to revise the special resolu-
tion, the directors’ motion was defeated on a show of hands by
36 votes to 27. The majority of dissenting voters then walked out
of the meeting; following which the directors resorted to a poll,
according to shares held rather than show of hands. The direc-
tors had the support of the majority of the shares polled. They
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won by 27,983 to 95 [The Times, 17 July 1906].
The dissenters circularized all BSA shareholders the follow-
ing week to warn them that the new resolution “will be injurious
to the shareholders by keeping them in ignorance of the position
of affairs” [The Times, 23 July 1906]. They proposed an amend-
ment which would allow an inner reserve to be created “when-
ever a dividend of not less than 171⁄2% is recommended to be
paid” [The Times, 25 July 1906] in contrast to the 10% of the
original resolution. There was “a long and heated discussion” at
the meeting held on 31 July to confirm the new resolution, but
the directors prevailed, by 79 votes to 42, having received 33,000
proxies in favor of the resolution and 9,000 against [The Times, 2
August 1906]. Newton attempted to revive the issue at BSA’s
annual general meeting in October, but “he was interrupted by a
number of shareholders and a motion was passed that he be not
heard on the subject” [The Times, 2 October 1906]. “Several
shareholders” asked for information about the internal reserve,
and were told by the chairman, Hallewell Rogers that the direc-
tors need not disclose it. The Times [2 October 1906] recorded
“Applause and cries of ‘shame’” at this, but the inner reserve was
maintained in 1907 and 1908. In 1909, however, the chairman
reported in the financial statements that “the Internal Reserve,
amounting to £30,000, has been included with the General Re-
serve Fund”. The directors had ceased to take advantage of the
special resolution. The Statist [1 October 1910, p.772] noted that
the secret reserve “has now received its quietus”.
Although the secret reserve was short-lived, the case and its
aftermath throw light on the governance of the company, and in
particular on two conflicts between directors and shareholders
which both reappeared more markedly in the interwar period.
These were the dissatisfaction of TS Walker, leading to his resig-
nation from the board in 1921, and the much more protracted
campaign led by EM Griffiths in the 1920s and early 1930s after
he left the board, and which was reinforced by complaints from
numerous shareholders. We now outline the issues which, we
argue, underlay these later conflicts.
Accounting Disclosure, Investors and “Speculators”: The argu-
ments put forward by both sides in Newton v BSA were not new.
The case for accounting disclosure had always been the need for
interested parties to be aware of the likely risk and return. With
respect to shareholders, the counter-argument was that limited
companies were potentially at the mercy of short-termists,
‘speculators’, who bought shares solely with a view to extracting
8
Accounting Historians Journal, Vol. 32 [2005], Iss. 1, Art. 6
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol32/iss1/6
157Lloyd-Jones, Lewis, Matthews, and Maltby:
Control, Conflict and Concession
a large dividend and then selling the shares in the depleted com-
pany. Prudent investors, by contrast, were prepared to invest for
a long period, and to trust the directors’ judgment. They did not
require comprehensive published disclosure; if they wanted
more information they would ask the directors for it. Buckley
was aligning himself with this dichotomy, when he invoked the
idea of prudence in support of understatement, in the opinion of
which part was quoted earlier: “Assets are often, by reason of
prudence, estimated, and stated to be estimated, at less than
their probably real value” [Law Report 2 Chancery, 387, 1906].
Newton does not, however, appear on closer examination to
have been a short-term investor, given the small size of his hold-
ing (40 shares, unlikely to yield a large short-term profit) and
the pains that he took: he brought a court case, spoke at a series
of meetings, circularized shareholders and made a final unsuc-
cessful intervention at the 1906 annual general meeting. Nor
was his supporter, Arthur Chamberlain, a speculator. He was a
knowledgeable investor, part of a major West Midlands indus-
trial and finance dynasty. His uncle, Herbert Chamberlain, had
been BSA’s Chairman from 1900 to 1904, and his cousin Neville
Chamberlain was a director of BSA between 1913 and 1922.
Arthur Chamberlain’s reasons for opposing secret reserves were
reported in The Times on 2 August 1906. He stated that “he did
not know any limited company in which the circumstances were
the same. The Small Arms Company had no private reserves for
ten years, and nothing could be more satisfactory than the con-
dition of the company during the first seven of the ten years.
They had a 20% dividend. Then they came to the change of the
board, and had three years of falling dividend. He found that to
be coincident with the change in the membership of the board”.
Chamberlain was accusing the board of bringing in a secret
reserve to hide their failings; in a good year, profits could be
hidden to be paid out in a bad one, and shareholders had no
way of monitoring the directors’ actual success or failure.
The Directors’ Defense: Rogers’ case for the new policy on secret
reserves was based on two arguments. One was a detailed de-
fense of the profit performance of the current board (see Table
1).
He pointed out that average annual profits 1903-1905 were
higher than those achieved 1896-1900 (leaving out the period of
the Boer War) – £63,158 compared with £60,311 [The Times, 27
July 1906]. His other argument was that the creation of secret
reserves was part of normal practice by respectable businesses.
9
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This was an important claim; it was made as early as February
1906 when the original resolution was tabled. A press notice by
BSA pointed out that the reserve was “similar to those which are
possessed by several of the leading commercial companies” [The
Times, 22 February 1906]. Similarly, Carter, BSA’s auditor, had
asserted that several other companies which he had audited had
used similar powers “in every case . . . to the advantage of the
companies and their shareholders” [The Times, 2 August 1906].
BSA’s Motives for Non-disclosure: One reason for the creation of
secret reserves was the discretion they gave directors in disclos-
ing performance: while useful because they could be used to
prevent short-termists from bleeding the company dry, more
importantly, as Chamberlain suggested, they allowed smoothing
of income. This could help to ward off any expectation for
higher dividends in good years, as well as depriving employees
of a basis to demand wage increases. Moreover, the less share-
holders knew about performance, the less scope there was for
them to attack directors in bad years and hence the stronger the
directors’ positions. In addition, secret reserves could help with
an acquisition. They meant that a potential buyer’s means were
not evident to the selling company, with implications for the
price agreed, and they allowed the acquirer to move fast when a
suitable target appeared, provided that the reserves had been
invested in suitably liquid assets. BSA created the reserve a year
before it acquired the Eadie Cycle Company, and ceased to use
TABLE 1
BSA Profits and Dividends, 1897-1909
BSA Profit £000 Dividend rate
1897 88 20
1898 60 20
1899 56 20
1900 58 20
1901 88 20
1902 95 20
1903 65 15
1904 51 121⁄2
1905 81 15
1906 74 15
1907 80 15
1908 99 15
1909 84 10
Source: The Statist, 1 October 1910, p.773
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it just before its acquisition of Daimler. This would fit with the
theory that the reserve was created as a means of funding div-
ersification. With the purchase of Daimler, BSA’s thirst for
acquisition was temporarily assuaged: no more subsidiaries
were acquired till 1919.
On this interpretation, the creation of a secret reserve at
BSA was less an act of prudence than a means of empowering
the directors, both to ward off criticism and to fund projects
without attracting scrutiny from shareholders. This problem
was not confined to BSA. Edwards [1989, p.148] comments that:
“The case, which has since been described as the ‘charter for the
creators of secret reserves’ . . . was partly responsible for secrecy,
obscurity, excessive summarization and distortion becoming
common features of financial reporting for the next quarter of a
century”. The clash at BSA in 1906 is indicative of the range of
views held by shareholders. Newton and Chamberlain repre-
sented a group that took a close interest in the performance of
the business and sought information in order to monitor what
was going on, thus their aversion to secrecy. They were defeated
by the votes of other shareholders who were prepared to tolerate
secrecy provided the directors generated an adequate return on
their investment. The outcome of the 1906 controversy was sup-
port for a secretive mode of governance that went without seri-
ous challenge until after the First World War. This mode of
governance was typical of F.D. Docker, who used secret reserves
as a means of saving for acquisitions. He was a member of the
BSA board and was to become very influential in the next major
episode in the development of governance at BSA.
THE CHANGING COMPOSITION OF THE BOARD:
THE BSA-DAIMLER MERGER
The secret reserve episode suggests that the BSA board
acted largely as a self perpetuating oligarchy, to the extent that
it took decisions which primarily satisfied itself. If shareholders
were dissatisfied, the board was prepared to resist them, even if
this involved protracted and acrimonious dispute.2 The secret
reserve was discontinued in 1910, we would argue, not because
it annoyed some shareholders, but because it was no longer
needed to fund acquisitions. As the abandonment of the secret
reserve policy occurred at the same juncture as the Daimler
2 For the role of boards see Keasey et al. [1997, p.7].
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merger, it is of interest to explore the strategic issues and mo-
tives underlying the merger and consider the consequences for
the company’s corporate governance.
Four broad conclusions may be drawn from BSA’s merger
with Daimler in 1910. Firstly, the merger was of key strategic
importance and had significant consequences for the structure
of power at the top levels of governance at BSA. Secondly, the
key decisions relating to the merger were made by a dominant
insider coalition, largely under the influence of Docker.3 Thirdly,
the aftermath of the merger was a shift in the locus of power in
the company and “strategic position” was assumed by a triumvi-
rate (of Rogers, Manville and Martin) who were responsible (as
outlined earlier in O’Sullivan’s definition of corporate gover-
nance) for the post-war strategic direction of BSA and who
owed their allegiance to Docker. Fourthly, the shift in “strategic
position” at BSA is indicative of the flexibility of personal capi-
talism as an organizational form but it is also suggestive that
personal capitalism offers no guarantee of a cozy or tranquil
system of governance as the dominant coalition were, subse-
quently, to confront a sustained challenge to their authority.4
The following sub-sections draw on the historical evidence to
explore the merger and its consequences for corporate gover-
nance at BSA.
“Strategic Position” and the Context of the Merger: 1906 was a
decisive year for BSA, Sir Hallewell Rogers became Chairman
and Docker joined the board. Rogers was a well established
Birmingham businessman and a former Lord Mayor of the city.
He had joined the BSA board in 1904 and was rapidly elevated
to the chairmanship. Rogers brought to the company an exper-
tise in finance (and no doubt was familiar with secret reserves),
having been a director of the Birmingham and District Banking
Company [see Davenport-Hines, 1984, p.48; 1985, pp.109-112],
and it was under his leadership that BSA embarked on a deter-
mined diversification strategy. Rogers was a personal friend of
Docker [see Midland Advertiser, 29 October 1911], and according
to Sir Patrick Hannon, who was to become a BSA director and a
Tory Member of Parliament, Docker “was responsible for mak-
ing him chairman of BSA” [Davenport-Hines, 1985, pp.109-112].
3 For an exploration of the concept of the insider coalition see Herman
[1981, p. 20]; Davenport-Hines [1984].
4 For another example of challenge to personal capitalist authority see
Lloyd-Jones and Lewis [2000].
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Docker was a high profile business leader, not only in the
Midland industrial district but also at national level. For
example, he was instrumental in setting up the Federation of
British Industry in 1916. Docker was also active in the National
Union of Manufacturers [see Marrison, 1996, pp.326-327]. His
prestige had risen sharply following the creation of the Metro-
politan Carriage Wagon and Finance Company (MCWF) in
1902, a combination of five railway carriage manufacturers.
Docker and the Metropolitan directors had powers to create se-
cret reserves and by 1910 they had built up a balance of
£450,000. According to Davenport-Hines [1984] such was
Docker’s reputation for “business infallibility” that “his expertise
was sought by other businesses”. He joined the board of several
companies who hoped to benefit from his “general business
judgement” and in other cases he was invited to play a leading
role in “arranging mergers” [Davenport-Hines, 1984, pp. 32, 35,
47]. There was clearly a close personal connection between
Docker and Rogers. Both were embedded in business and politi-
cal networks. For example, Rogers was active in the right-wing
pressure group the British Commonwealth Union, a group of
which Docker happened to be President, [see Davenport-Hines,
1985, pp. 109-112; Marrison, 1996, pp. 346, 353], and what
emerged at BSA from 1906 was a strong Docker-Rogers axis.
Their “strategic position” at the company was further re-
inforced in 1907 when Lincoln Chandler, a co-director of
Docker’s at MCWF, joined the BSA board. Why did this power-
ful coalition, enjoying “strategic position”, initiate the merger
with Daimler?
The Merger: In 1906 BSA purchased a former Royal Small Arms
Factory at Sparkbrook in Birmingham and used the facilities to
enter the new and expanding motor car industry [see Church,
1995, p. 3; Saul, 1962, Thoms and Donnelly, 2002]. The decision
to diversify into motor manufacture mirrored similar decisions
made by other cycle firms such as Riley, Humber, Allard, Swift,
Lee Francis and Singer [Lloyd-Jones and Lewis, 2000, p.40]. By
1908 BSA had developed three models but these proved not to
be a business success [Nixon, n.d., p.132], and by 1909 the con-
dition of the motor department was deteriorating sharply. In the
following year a damaging internal report on the motor de-
partment’s organization and performance was submitted to the
board. It charged that there had been no effective cost control,
the general manager had proved incapable of effective organiza-
tion and had “presided over anarchy...in design, production and
13
Lloyd-Jones et al.: Control, conflict and concession: Corporate governance, accounting and accountability at Birmingham Small Arms, 1906-1933
Published by eGrove, 2005
Accounting Historians Journal, June 2005162
after sales” [Davenport-Hines, 1984, p.50; Modern Record Cen-
tre, Warwick, (hereafter MRC) Mss 19A/1/2/16-17]. Clearly the
dominant coalition at BSA feared that the company’s reputation
could be seriously damaged. Docker took action to solve the
problem of the ailing motor department by arranging a merger
with Daimler. Three factors underpinned Docker’s strategy.
Firstly, buying in Daimler’s core capabilities would act to prop-
up BSA’s motor car venture. Secondly, the merger appealed to
Docker’s penchant for financial deals and allowed him to exploit
the extensive business networks he had established in the Mid-
lands. Thirdly, Docker was impressed by Daimler’s financial
strength. The Statist, for example, sang Daimler’s praises in
1906, calling attention to the company’s “conservative financial
management” [3 November 1906].
The merger caught the attention of the financial press.
Daimler was one of Britain’s largest car producers [Davenport-
Hines, 1984, p.50] and The Financial Times commented that “the
combination is one of the most important ever effected in the
motor industry” [27 September 1910]. The merger was facili-
tated by the fact that Docker had close business, personal and
political links with a number of the top management at Daimler,
including its Chairman (Manville), its Managing Director (Percy
Martin) and a director (George Flett). Manville had a number of
business connections with Docker. Both became directors of the
Metropolitan Railway and “were political adherents during the
war period (1914-18) when Docker was President of the FBI and
Manville led the Association of British Chambers of Commerce”
[Davenport-Hines, 1984, p.51]. When Manville was elected
Member of Parliament for Coventry in 1918 he received finan-
cial support from Docker’s British Commonwealth Union.
Marrison [1996, pp. 369-370] refers to Manville in the 1920s as
“being in a close orbit to Docker”. There seems little doubt that
Docker coveted Daimler’s expertise and financial strength and
his knowledge of that company’s affairs was also reinforced by
the fact that George Flett, a Daimler director, also sat on the
board of Docker’s MCWF.5
The Consequence of Merger and Corporate Governance at BSA:
The BSA-Daimler merger was not without controversy. Daven-
port-Hines has described it as an “over-tortuous scheme of
5 For Daimler’s financial performance see Davenport-Hines [1984, p.51]; The
Financial Times [2 September 1910]; Nixon [n.d. pp. 28-29]; The Statist [1 Octo-
ber 1910, pp. 772-774].
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indebtedness, leading to over-capitalisation” [1984, p. 52].
Docker insisted that Daimler should pay BSA a dividend of
£100,000 per year and there is little doubt that this seriously
weakened Daimler by leaving it short of funds to develop its
motor vehicle and engine capabilities. This begs the question:
why did Daimler’s directors agree to such a deal? This was all
the more surprising given that their close business networks
with Docker would have meant they would have been aware of
his financial deal making. In effect a trade-off was made be-
tween the financial details of the merger and a major change in
the governance of the new amalgamation, which brought a fun-
damental restructuring of the BSA main board. The ol’ BSA
directors were culled and a leaner board, mainly consisting of
Docker acolytes, assumed a “strategic position” at the company.
The main board was reduced from 11 to seven (four former BSA
and three former Daimler directors) post merger (see Table 2).
Hallewell Rogers, Lincoln Chandler, Edward Manville and
Percy Martin with Docker at the centre formed the dominant
coalition. The other two directors were A.H.E. Wood, a major
shareholder, and A. Eadie, who was a carry-over from the 1906
acquisition and reflected the importance of bicycles to company
TABLE 2
Key Players in Three Episodes
Newton v BSA 1906:
Sir A. Newton, shareholder.
Arthur Chamberlain, shareholder, nephew of Herbert Chamberlain
former Chairman of BSA.
A. N. Chamberlain, Director on the BSA board, 1900-04, 1912-16 and
1918-22.
Hallewell Rogers, Chairman BSA.
F. D. Docker, Director 1906.
Daimler Merger 1910:
F.D. Docker, Director.
Hallewell Rogers, Chairman BSA.
E. Manville, Chairman Daimler, becomes Deputy Chairman BSA.
P. Martin, Managing Director Daimler, becomes Managing Director BSA.
E. M. Griffiths’ criticisms, 1920-32:
T.S. Walker, Director BSA.
E.M. Griffiths, joined BSA board on acquisition of Burton, Griffiths, 1919.
A. Eadie, Director BSA.
A. N. Chamberlain, Chairman BSA Cycles to 1922.
P. Martin, Managing Director BSA.
Hallewell Rogers, Chairman BSA to 1928.
A.H. Pollen, briefly Chairman in 1932. A. Roger, Chairman from 1933.
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profits. No doubt Flett would have joined the board but he had
been killed in 1910 as the result of crashing his Daimler after
leaving a MCWF board meeting [Davenport-Hines, 1984, pp. 50-
51].
The post-merger board was very much a Docker and
Daimler affair, with the incoming directors effectively gaining
strategic control of decision making at BSA as Martin became
Managing Director, and Manville Deputy Chair. These two men,
alongside Docker and Rogers played the dominant role in that
they determined strategy and structure at the company and
shaped its investment decisions. The terms of the merger deal
also consolidated ownership and control at BSA, and it retained
the form of a personal capitalist organization. Martin and
Wood, who were two of the largest shareholders at Daimler at
the time of the merger, became substantial shareholders in the
re-constituted BSA [The Statist, 1 October 1910, pp. 772-774].
Though the holdings of the new board were not substantial
enough to guarantee outright ownership, it nevertheless allowed
the members of the dominant coalition, when it suited them, to
argue that they were strongly identified, as a personal capitalist
firm, with the interests of the company’s shareholders. As Quail
has pointed out, “the theoretical justification for the larger pow-
ers of . . . directors remained their role as a group of proprietors
standing for the proprietors as a whole” [2000, p.3].
Docker left the board of BSA in 1912, but he did not neces-
sarily forgo his influence on the governance of the company. He
remained active behind the scenes, attended the annual meeting
in 1922, reappearing as a director in 1940, and apparently or-
chestrating the four changes in BSA’s chairmanship between
1928 and 1933 [see Davenport-Hines, 1984]. It is clear that from
1912, governance at BSA remained under the control of Rogers,
Manville and Martin, and it was this triumvirate who faced and
managed confrontations with a determined, knowledgeable and
sustained shareholder group. This conflict is explored in the
next section.
THE BOARD AND DISSIDENT DIRECTORS
In the interwar period, BSA went through two separate but
related episodes of conflict between directors and shareholders.
The following section of the paper considers the reactions of two
dissident ‘insider’ investors to its poor interwar performance.
We first consider T.S. Walker, who was highly critical of BSA in
the early 1920s, and then E.M. Griffiths, whose relationship
16
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with the company, as a director and then a shareholder, contin-
ued until the mid-1930s. Both raised similar concerns, but
Griffiths did so more persistently and vocally. The two episodes,
we argue, reveal growing criticisms of the company’s gover-
nance structure. These were motivated partly by its performance
in the difficult interwar period, and partly by a changing set of
expectations among investors. New pressures required BSA to
react in new ways, and senior management had some difficulty
in responding appropriately, as the very stable structure inher-
ited from Daimler and confirmed after 1919 rendered it difficult
to adapt rapidly to change.
Changes to the Group of Companies: After the end of the First
World War, BSA’s stated policy was that they would, in Rogers’
words, “make the smallest possible range of products on the
largest possible scale” [The Economist, 29 April 1922]. However,
over the following decade the company proceeded to make ac-
quisitions in a diverse range of industries, as summarized in
Table 3.
TABLE 3
Timeline of Events at BSA, 1861-1934
1861 Company formed.
1873 Becomes private limited company.
1896 Becomes quoted limited liability company.
1906 Acquires Royal Small Arms Factory at Sparkbrook.
F.D. Docker joins board.
Hallewell Rogers becomes Chairman.
1906/7 Merger with Eadie Manufacturing Company, producers of bicycle com-
ponents, bicycles and motor cycles.
1910 Merger with Daimler (1904) Ltd.Major board changes occur.
1918 Purchase of shares in British Abrasive Wheel.
1919 Adoption of the holding company form, BSA Cycle, Rifle and Tool de-
partments formed into subsidiary companies.
Three new acquisitions to the holding company made in 1919: 1) Will-
iam Jessop & Co., 2) J.J. Saville & Co., both Sheffield specialist steel
producers, and 3) Burton, Griffiths and Co., London machine tool
merchants.
1920 Acquisition of Aircraft Manufacturing Co. and Peter Hooker Ltd (engine
manufacturer).
E.M. Griffiths’ criticisms begin.
1923 Aircraft Manufacturing Co and Peter Hooker Ltd liquidated.
1928 E. Manville becomes Chairman.
1929 Arthur Andrews Ltd, machine tools merchants acquired.
1931 Lanchester Motor Co. acquired.Daimler Hire sold.
1932 In July A.H. Pollen replaces Manville as Chairman.
In December, Sir Alexander Roger replaces Pollen.
1934 British Abrasive Wheel sold.
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BSA’s performance was very troubled, for a variety of rea-
sons. One of these, clearly, was the series of economic crises of
the 1920s and 1930s, affecting both industrial and consumer
demand [see Buxton and Aldcroft, 1979; Glynn and Booth, 1996;
Pollard, 1983]. Until the rearmament drive of the late 1930s,
BSA Guns was very short of work. Demand for cars, particularly
at the top end of the range, was low. In addition, the post-1919
acquisitions generated disappointing returns and also absorbed
funds that might have been more profitably used elsewhere. The
Sheffield steelmakers, J.J. Saville & Company and William
Jessop & Company, had been acquired in the expectation that
they would be intensively used in post-war reconstruction, but
they did not produce the hoped-for return. The Peter Hooker
Ltd and Aircraft Manufacturing Company acquisitions very rap-
idly proved mistakes and had to be put into liquidation within
18 months of joining the group. The Lanchester Motor Com-
pany was purchased in 1931 as a means of acquiring “a name as
old as Daimler and . . . a market for high price cars” [Coventry
Record Office (hereafter CRO) PA 594/4/6/2, Lanchester take-
over file, letter dated 26 February 1931]. Unfortunately, the mar-
ket for such cars in 1931 was not healthy, and Lanchester’s
contribution to the group’s profitability was disappointing.
The result of poor investment decisions by BSA in relation
to these acquisitions was low profitability, and the reduction or
disappearance of dividends. Table 4 sets out the company’s per-
formance 1910-1939 and highlights in particular the frequent
absence of the ordinary dividend, which was paid out only six
times between 1920 and 1939. Table 5 gives the quoted price of
the £1 ordinary share from 1918 onwards. The most striking
features of this are the very rapid fall in share price in the
aftermath of the War, and the fact that it remained far below
par for most of the inter-war period. Ordinary shareholders who
had bought before 1920 found themselves saddled with shares
on which they were bound to make a loss on disposal, and
which did not generate a satisfactory return. Their dissatisfac-
tion was to be reflected in the annual general meetings of the
1930s, which are discussed below.
Management Structure: There was also a continuing and serious
problem of management, at board level and below, which re-
sulted not only in the poor investment decisions made but in
muddled internal management of operations. In 1919 Hallewell
Rogers had claimed that the new companies would have “sepa-
rate detailed management” [CRO PA 594/1/12/3 chairman’s
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TABLE 4
BSA Profits and Dividends, 1910-1939
Year BSA Profit (Loss) Ordinary Preference
£000 £000 £000
1910 98 77 10
1911* 233 114 10
1912 178 114 10
1913 188 114 10
1914 190 119 10
1915 408 169 10
1916 382 231 22
1917 428 230 22
1918 435 161 22
1919 373 232 22
(31 July)
1921 567 151 22
 (18 months to
31 Jan)
1922 (469) — 21
1923 (167) — 23
1924 125 — 24
1925 179 109 24
1926 185 134 24
1927 112 — 12
1928 72 — 24
1929 90 — 24
1930 148 106 24
1931 (204) — 24
1932 (798) — —
1933 245 — —
1934 128 — —
1935 112 — —
1936 171 — 39
1937 398 — 102
1938 431 204 22
1939 411 109 21
* including Daimler from 1911.
Source: Coventry Record Office, PA 594, BSA Financial Statements, 1910-1939.
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TABLE 5
BSA Quoted Share Price, 1918-1939
Year Share price Capitalization (£000)
1918 59s 6d 3428
1919 35s 4159
1920 27s 7 d 3801
1921 12s 2d 1689
1922 7s 9d 986
1923 11s 9d 1689
1924 10s 1408
1925 14s 1971
1926 15s 9d 2252
1927 13s 9d 1943
1928 11s 4d 1548
1929 7s 6d 1056
1930 9s 6d 1379
1931 7s 6d 1056
1932 6s 3d 844
1933 5s 7d 732
1934 14s 6d 2027
1935 8s 9d 1239
1936 12s 3d 1689
1937 27s 3800
1938 19s 3d 2674
1939 25s 7d 3519
Source: The Times, various issues.
Note: BSA had a quotation on the London Stock Exchange from 1918 onwards.
The figures here are the share price on the last trading day of March for
each year, and the market capitalization of the ordinary share capital.
speech 1919]. But the resulting structure suffered from a perma-
nent tension between the notion of separate management and
apparent unwillingness to devolve power from the main board
to the boards of the subsidiaries. Church [1990, p.710] describes
the experience of BSA from 1918 to 1940 as one of irrelevant
structural reorganizations and reshuffling of top managers un-
der a board of directors that was mediocre despite its rapid
turnover of personnel (BSA had four chairmen in the five years
ending in 1932). The one fixed point was the triumvirate of
Hallewell Rogers, Manville and Martin which was in place until
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1932. There was continuing tension between engineers and
finance/marketing management [Davenport-Hines, 1984, p.229]
and a lack of co-ordination between the different subsidiaries.
T.S. Walker: Walker became a director of BSA in 1919, following
the death of his father, T.F. Walker, who had served as a direc-
tor for 32 years and who was Chairman 1904-06. T.S. Walker
resigned from the board in December 1921. The main reason for
his departure was his unhappiness with the company’s perfor-
mance, on three grounds, which he set out in a letter to
Hallewell Rogers [CRO PA 594/2/1/59, 15 December 1921]. He
was critical of “excessive expenditure” on salaries and on capital
items, of staff selection policy, and most importantly, of BSA’s
governance structure. He wrote at the time of his resignation
that his views were “fundamentally opposed to Mr Martin’s
schemes” in this respect (“Mr Martin” here represents the ruling
group of directors).
The post-1919 structure put Manville and Martin on every
subsidiary board, and Eadie and Pollen were each on two sub-
sidiaries. There was a danger that the structure would be so
centralized that the subsidiaries could not apply local knowl-
edge and act autonomously to their own advantage. This danger
was increased by the retention of financial control by the parent
board. The subsidiaries were required to report upwards and be
subject to main board decisions “on matters of importance and
policy”, and they leased their fixed assets from the parent [CRO
PA594/1/1/3/58, 30 November 1928]. According to Walker, the
new structure resulted in over-centralization so that senior staff
at the parent company were responsible for “multifarious du-
ties” at the subsidiaries as well. Each subsidiary should, he ar-
gued, be controlled by a managing director who was “a man of
wide experience in the particular trade” and who would “give
the whole of his time to the business” [CRO PA 594/2/1/59, 15
December 1921].
BSA’s Response: Martin’s response to Walker’s criticisms was
dismissive. He justified the level of expenditure; it was impor-
tant not to destroy the organization at a time of “shrinkage in
the market”, whilst recruitment had been “on the whole ex-
tremely successful” [CRO PA 594/2/1/59, 29 December 1921].
Martin recognized that BSA’s structure was the “chief funda-
mental difference” between Walker and himself [CRO PA 594/2/
1/59, 29 December 1921]. He objected that Walker’s proposal of
devolving management would be unduly expensive, leading to
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“numerous and extravagant appointments” [CRO PA 594/2/1/59,
29 December 1921]. Martin asserted that the present structure
allowed “a very efficient form of team work” [CRO PA 594/2/1/
59, 29 December 1921]. His overall theme was that a large and
centralized organization was crucial to BSA’s success and sur-
vival: Walker’s scheme of devolved authority would destroy it.
Developments after 1921 suggest that neither side in the
dispute had quite understood the situation. Walker’s character-
ization of the group as over-centralized and Martin’s praise of
“team work” were not borne out by the levels of intra-group
trading actually achieved. A memorandum by the parent board
commented that the relationship between BSA Tools and Bur-
ton Griffiths “was that of two self-contained companies . . . act-
ing independently” [CRO PA 594/1/1/3/3, 29 February 1924]. The
Economist of 11 May 1929 referred to attempts to promote
closer working of William Jessop & Company and J.J. Saville &
Company (both Sheffield- based firms) under “a common man-
agement”. In 1932, the board considered the consultant Webster
Jenkinson’s proposal of “consolidating the subsidiary companies
into a small number of groups” [MRC Mss19A1/2/56 f19]. These
comments from different sources over a number of years sug-
gest that it was recognized that the companies in the group were
not in fact operating in an integrated way: common ownership
had not resulted in common control of their activities. It would
seem that Walker’s resignation was more about the theory than
the practice of governance at BSA. He overestimated the real
extent of centralization in the group. It appears as if the triumvi-
rate of Martin, Manville and Rogers was not open to discussion.
In Hirschman’s terminology [1970], Walker found a prompt exit
a more satisfactory option than the use of voice. In this respect
he differed markedly from the other dissident who we now con-
sider, E. M. Griffiths.
E. M. Griffiths: E.M. Griffiths was, like Walker, a director who
resigned from BSA in the 1920s. But unlike Walker, Griffiths
continued his involvement with the company until the mid-
1930s, and again unlike Walker, he did not act alone. He com-
municated with shareholders, both by circularizing them and by
his detailed interventions at shareholders’ meetings. A study of
Griffiths’ conflict with the company cannot thus be separated
from the critical reaction of shareholders generally. Further,
Griffiths is also of interest because, unlike Walker, he took seri-
ously the role of financial reporting in corporate governance,
and involved BSA’s auditors in his dispute with their clients. His
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campaign treated the company not as an isolated problem but
as part of a wider set of issues concerning the amount of infor-
mation and control conceded by quoted companies to their
shareholders. Griffiths was active at a time when minority
shareholders were becoming more assertive. For instance the
Shareholders’ Protection Association was founded in October
1932 [The Economist, 9 September 1933, p. 499]. Griffiths was
able to associate himself with a group of small investors who
were not content to stay silent when dissatisfied. This was a new
challenge to the personal capitalism of BSA, and it took the
board some time to adjust to it.
E.M. Griffiths and Corporate Structure: E.M. Griffiths was Chair-
man of Burton Griffiths (a London-based machine tool sales
agency) when BSA acquired it in 1919. He retained the chair-
manship of his company and was also placed on the boards of
BSA and BSA Tools Ltd. As a result of the acquisition Griffiths
became a large shareholder in BSA: with 45,000 ordinary shares
he was the third largest individual shareholder. When he re-
signed from his directorships between 1921 and 1922, Griffiths
used his shareholding as a base from which to launch a much
more comprehensive attack than T.S. Walker, on the governance
and performance of the company over the next decade.
Griffiths first signaled his dissatisfaction in 1921, when he
resigned from the Burton Griffiths board “as my advice was
over-ruled” [CRO PA 594/2/1/59 Griffiths to Rogers, 21 February
1922]. Like T.S. Walker, he also attacked the group structure.
He blamed this, rather than external economic conditions, for
the poor performance as signaled by the low dividend paid out.
He pointed out that the new group had duplication of services
— e.g. two firms of auditors, two lawyers — as well as “other
highly paid officials with non specific titles or responsibility”
[CRO PA 594/2/1/59 Griffiths to Rogers, 21 February 1922]. The
company, from his perspective was overwhelmed with “red tape,
reports, routines &c” [CRO PA 594/2/1/59 Griffiths to Rogers, 21
February 1922]. Griffiths proposed “two more managing direc-
tors, having real knowledge and experience of the particular
business they have to manage and having proper and specified
responsibilities” [CRO PA 594/2/1/59 Griffiths to Rogers, 21 Feb-
ruary 1922]. He determined to introduce more operational ex-
pertise and reduce the level of bureaucracy in the company.
Hallewell Rogers rebutted Griffiths’ criticisms. The direc-
tors had thought it a “sound policy” to restrict the dividend.
Griffiths had himself requested copious amounts of informa-
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tion; reports were in any case needed “for the general good”
[CRO PA 594/2/1/59 Rogers to Griffiths, 24 February 1922]. Evi-
dently, the board of BSA were not prepared to discuss his criti-
cisms. Griffiths soon afterwards resigned from all his director-
ships, though he continued to take a very detailed interest in the
company’s performance.
E.M. Griffiths and Financial Disclosure; The Role of the Auditors:
In 1927, Griffiths wrote to Eadie, who had “sympathized” with
him at the time of his resignation, with a list of detailed ques-
tions about the performance of the subsidiaries, including
whether BSA Tools, Burton, Griffiths and Daimler Hire were
profitable, how the obsolete BSA Guns plant was being valued,
and how the group intended to repay its 6.5% loans [CRO PA
594/2/1/59 Griffiths to Eadie, 28 March 1927]. BSA’s reaction
was initially as quietly dismissive as it had been towards
Walker’s criticisms. On 13 May 1927, Martin advised him that
“your questions were before us in outlining the chairman’s
speech”, which had been delivered at the annual meeting on 10
May. If Griffiths read this “carefully” he would find his ques-
tions answered [CRO PA 594/2/1/59 Martin to Griffiths, 13 May
1927]. Griffiths did not find the answers, only “general allu-
sions”, and was provoked to take the unusual step of writing to
Carters, and to Touche and Company, BSA’s two firms of audi-
tors. His argument was that “this company’s balance sheets do
not give the shareholders sufficient information” and to ask that
the “coming balance sheet” should be more informative [CRO
PA 594/2/1/59 Griffiths to Carters, 10 December 1927].
Griffiths was reflecting a lively contemporary debate about
the need for reforms of corporate accounting. The Greene Com-
mittee had been formed in 1925 to take evidence on the issue of
company law reform. Modernizers strongly urged the need for
financial statements to be more explicit, for publication of a
profit and loss account as well as a balance sheet, and for
groups of companies, like BSA, to be obliged to produce consoli-
dated financial statements that would show the performance of
the subsidiaries as well as the parent company. The idea of
consolidated statements had been discussed in the U.K. since
1919, but the practice had been slow to catch on [see Edwards,
1989, pp. 225-238]. General objections from within British
boardrooms were that shareholders were protected by the audit,
that they could ask the directors for any information they
wanted, and that compulsory disclosure was commercially
damaging. BSA followed this trend. The company produced a
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balance sheet showing the subsidiaries in a single line as part of
the parent’s investments, and reported a single figure of credit to
profit and loss including income from the subsidiaries. The
chairman’s speech to the annual meeting included commentary
on the performance of the subsidiaries, but in as much or as
little detail as he chose.
Griffiths’ letters to the auditors provoked an immediate re-
action. The two audit firms discussed a reply and also conferred
with Hallewell Rogers within a week of receiving Griffith’s let-
ter. Both firms were in agreement “as to the undesirability of . . .
being inveigled into a discussion with a shareholder” about the
accounts [CRO PA 594/2/1/59 Carters to Touche, 11 January
1928]. These were “a matter for the discretion of the directors”
and the auditors could not intervene in this [CRO PA 594/2/1/59
Carters to Touche, 16 December 1927]. But Touche also com-
mented that they had “a good deal of sympathy” with Griffiths’
proposals. BSA’s balance sheet gave “practically no information
about the position of the operating companies”. They favored
“full and frank information to shareholders” [CRO PA 594/2/1/59
Touche to Carters, 15 December 1927]. BSA was seen by profes-
sionals as being unhelpful, but company law would not compel
them to be more informative, and the legal position was un-
changed from Buckley’s 1906 views. Carters commented that
Griffiths’ “attitude as an ex-director of the company is perhaps
not identical with that of the average shareholder” [CRO PA 594/
2/1/59 Carters to Davis n.d.], but he was taking a stance on
behalf of all shareholders. His letters to the auditors were sup-
ported by references to “recent events connected with Messrs
Vickers, Armstrong, Whitworth, Marconi etc” (i.e. financial
scandals) which had “come out to the astonishment of share-
holders and the public alike” [CRO PA 594/2/1/59 Griffiths to
Carters, 3 January 1928].
From 1928 onwards Griffiths seems to have stepped up his
campaign to improve BSA’s communication of financial infor-
mation. He may have seen the disclosure of more information as
providing an incentive to better financial performance, as direc-
tors might then expect better-informed shareholders to be more
vocal in their criticisms and more likely to apply pressure via
their votes at the annual general meeting. In January 1928, for
instance, Griffiths sent Carters a long list of suggestions for in-
formation that might be included in the annual reports [CRO PA
594/2/1/59 Griffiths to Carters, 3 January 1928]. He was also
concerned with BSA’s comparatively poor return on capital
employed. In March 1929, he circulated the largest ordinary
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shareholders in BSA (those with 500 or more shares) with a
letter reviewing the profit position. BSA had, over the previous
81⁄2 years, produced an average return of 1.75% on its share
capital. By comparison Rolls-Royce had paid an 8% dividend in
the same period, the Enfield Cycle Company 10%, Edgar Allen
and Kayser Ellison (both steel companies) 2.5% and 5% respec-
tively [CRO PA 594/2/1/59 Griffiths to shareholders, March
1929]. Griffiths had chosen this selection of firms to mirror in
the minds of the shareholders the composition of the BSA group
(a prestige motor manufacturer, a respectable cycle and motor
cycle company, two specialist steel firms). Obviously the back-
ground to these better results would need to be considered: how
was it that the sum of BSA’s parts produced worse results than
one might expect from individual component companies?
Griffiths had invoked a simple but stark contrast.
Over the period of Griffiths’ criticisms, BSA had in fact
made some voluntary concessions in relation to financial report-
ing. Starting from the 1928 year-end, BSA produced a ‘consoli-
dated statement’ which stated the aggregated assets and liabili-
ties of the subsidiaries. This reflected a trend in the 1920s for “a
modest rate” of increase in the number of companies producing
group information [see Edwards and Webb, 1984; Edwards,
1989]. BSA’s statement was better than the one-line entry, but as
all the reserve accounts, including profit and loss and also de-
preciation, were according to Griffiths “lumped together”, it left
the information “difficult and obscure” [CRO PA 594/2/1/59
Griffiths to Manville, 5 April 1928].
The directors were well aware of the threat that Griffiths
represented. In July 1928, R. Rotherham, one of the directors of
J.J. Saville & Company, wrote to Martin suggesting ways to
“fight” him. One of these was to invite Griffiths to rejoin the
board. If he refused, his criticisms could be ignored: if he re-
joined, he would be placated [CRO PA 594/2/1/59 Rotherham
memo to Martin, 18 July 1928]. This proposal suggested that the
board saw the problem presented by Griffiths in outsider/insider
terms. Seven years after resigning, he was no longer a well-
informed insider, but a kind of unelected representative of the
main body of shareholders.
The Annual General Meeting as an Outlet for Criticisms: Cer-
tainly, Griffiths contributed to some very tense annual general
meetings over the next few years, and although he typified Brit-
ish investors as “patient oxen” [CRO PA 594/2/1/59 Rotherham
memo to Martin, 18 July 1928], the BSA directors in fact had to
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deal with numerous shareholders’ criticisms at annual meetings
in the early 1930s. These included comments about the “want of
energy and ability behind the directors and the management”
and the need for “a body of competent business men”, the dona-
tions made by BSA to Birmingham University and searching
questions about the reserves [CRO PA 594/1/1/2/13 BSA meet-
ings file 1931, TS draft of discussion following chairman’s
speech, pp. 21, 22-36]. The Chairman, Manville, put up a poor
fight against these, finally telling one persistent questioner that
“It is too complicated to explain in a few words. If you want a
detailed explanation I will see you are written to” [CRO PA 594/
1/1/2/13 BSA meetings file 1931, TS draft of discussion following
chairman’s speech, p.37]. One of the directors, Pollen, later de-
scribed the meeting as a “fiasco” [CRO PA 594/2/1/2/23 Pollen to
Martin, 8 December 1931].
The 1932 annual meeting, held at the nadir of BSA’s for-
tunes, was even stormier. At this meeting, Griffiths spoke at
great length. He identified himself with investors (as opposed to
speculators) whom he saw as “the backbone of the company”
[CRO PA 594/1/1/2/15 BSA meetings file, 15 November 1932, TS
draft of discussion following chairman’s speech, p.12]. A variety
of other speakers also raised detailed queries about the results,
and in some cases criticized the structure of the board. For
example, one shareholder was critical of the appointment of a
new director (Alexander Roger) who had “twenty directorates”.
Another thought that there were “too many directors . . . pulling
the strings and getting the profits”, an allusion, presumably
to their fees [CRO PA 594/1/1/2/15 BSA meetings file, 15 Novem-
ber 1932, TS draft of discussion following chairman’s speech,
p.21].
The Effects of Criticism at Annual Meetings: The shareholders
who spoke at annual general meetings tended to rebut Carters’
suggestion quoted above that Griffiths’ interests were not those
of “the average shareholder”. The annual meeting was a forum
in which the more motivated small shareholder could make de-
tailed and knowledgeable criticisms. It could be argued, how-
ever, that there was little they could do to make fundamental
changes in the way BSA was run, and that they were an irritant
rather than a threat for the board. Minority control by a block of
board members meant that shareholders could not readily vote
down the directors. Poor performance made the prospect of
disposal of shareholdings on the market unattractive as inves-
tors would be faced with selling at a loss, and this was not a
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period in which a hostile takeover (offering a change of top
management) would have been an option.6 A bad-tempered an-
nual meeting, though a trying experience for the directors, did
not predict an upheaval in ownership.
The harm criticism might do, however, was in making BSA
appear as a bad lending risk if news coverage and gossip spread
details of a “fiasco” like the 1931 meeting. At the end of 1931 the
Midland Bank threatened to withdraw its overdraft support to
BSA. If the bank went ahead with this threat and the company
had to agree a change in financial structure, it would require the
support of shareholders at an extraordinary general meeting.
Pollen commented that at any future meeting the board would
need to get the “active co-operation” of ordinary shareholders
[CRO PA 594/2/1/2/23 Pollen to Martin, 28 December 1931]. The
reaction of the latter, he continued, “is not a pleasant kind of
music to face, but it makes the whole difference if the music is
of our own composition” [CRO PA 594/2/1/2/23 Pollen to Martin,
28 December 1931]. The implication was that BSA could no
longer rely on bland responses or on the support of the courts: it
would have to get the shareholders on its side by persuading
them that the board was competent to steer the company
through financial hardship.
Thus the effect of the criticisms at annual meetings was to
further undermine the strategic position of the controlling tri-
umvirate, which was already seriously threatened by the bank’s
increasing concern about the company’s liquidity situation. This
combination of shareholder and stakeholder dissatisfaction gave
Docker, by now a senior member of the Midland Bank board, an
opportunity to intervene again in governance at BSA. Through
Docker’s backroom influence, Sir Alexander Roger was ap-
pointed chair at the end of 1932, and he assembled a new re-
gime to take BSA through the remainder of the 1930s. Share-
holder and stakeholder behavior was crucial in altering board
membership. The episode illustrates that personal capitalism
was susceptible to challenge — what Hirschman [1970] terms
the exercise of “voice” — and could be changed. Strategic posi-
tion under personal capitalism had to be defended as sustained
criticism could enforce concessions.
BSA’s Responses to Criticism: Certainly, in the later 1930s, BSA
seems to have taken a number of steps to improve shareholder
6 See Hannah [1974, p.70] on the reasons for the rarity of takeovers before
the 1950s in the UK.
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opinion. The change in board composition was not the only one.
The annual meetings appear to have been more carefully man-
aged than hitherto. Whereas the annual meetings at the begin-
ning of the 1930s seem to have been a forum in which Griffiths
(and others) went on the attack and the directors stood their
ground (or lost it) as best they could, the later meetings show
greater planning. There was more of an attempt to take control
of the event. The 1933 annual meeting was preceded by tours of
the Midlands factories, a buffet lunch and a “talking film presen-
tation” about the different cars produced by the group.
Alexander Roger, the Chairman, gave a speech, the draft of
which had been discussed with seven managers [CRO PA594/1/
1/2/16 Meetings file, 1933]. At the 1933 annual meeting, only
two questions about the financial position were asked, one with
the rider “If you think that it is inopportune to answer the ques-
tion I shall be quite satisfied” and another which Roger admit-
ted he had expected and to which he had prepared a written
reply [CRO PA594/1/1/2/16 Meetings file, 1933]. Roger could
thus give the impression of being in control.
Two other changes reduced conflict. From 1934 onwards,
the production of far more detailed consolidated accounts did
much to address shareholders’ concerns about disclosure. The
Accountant praised BSA’s 1934 accounts as “an excellent ex-
ample of modern practice” and published them in full “for the
perusal of our readers” [27 October 1934]. It did so again on 6
November 1935 and 29 October 1938. This was a remarkable
reversal of the situation in the 1920s, when The Statist [1 May
1926] had described BSA’s reluctance to disclose as “regret-
table”. Also pleasing for investors was the improvement in BSA’s
financial position, with a rather wavering return to profit from
1932 and a definite recovery, accompanied by the resumption of
preference and then ordinary dividends, after 1936. Increased
demand for armaments and also for cars, motor cycles and bi-
cycles contributed, as did internal reorganization. By the annual
meeting of 1938, there was a string of congratulations for the
chairman’s “very inspiring remarks” [CRO PA594/1/1/2/23 Meet-
ings file, 1938]. It is debatable how far investors were swayed by
the reappearance of dividends, and how far by the changes in
corporate governance — financial reporting and reorganization
— which suggested that they could have more of an insight into
BSA’s performance. The fact that the governance changes pre-
ceded the dividend resumption suggests that it was the former
which were more influential.
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Commentary on E.M. Griffiths’ Criticisms: The pressure that
Griffiths put on the company to increase its disclosure (and the
response it eventually invoked) is of particular interest because
it reflected the ongoing controversy during the 1920s and 1930s
about the extent to which companies in Great Britain should
improve their disclosure to shareholders. The Companies Act,
1929, was seen by a number of commentators as a disappoint-
ment because it did not do enough to mandate comprehensive
disclosure, such as the production of consolidated financial
statements and a profit and loss account. The Institute of Char-
tered Accountants in England and Wales stated in 1928 that
shareholders who were unhappy with corporate disclosure had
“the remedy to a large extent in their own hands” in that they
could ask questions at annual meetings and/or stipulate that
annual reports should be more informative. Hence, further legis-
lative interference was unnecessary and indeed undesirable as
this would open up companies to pressure from trades unions
and others [see Maltby, 2000].
Historians of accounting and auditing have traced the tran-
sition from this hands-off stance to the much more comprehen-
sive disclosure mandated by the Companies Act, 1947. Kitchen
[1972] and Edwards [1976] chart the varying attitudes of the
accounting profession to wider disclosure. The publicity given in
the 1930s to the Royal Mail Steam Packet scandal increased
awareness of the desirability of more informative accounts, but
did not do away with the suspicion that companies would be
better left to make their own independent solutions to account-
ing problems. Bircher [1988 and 1991] comments that the inter-
vention of some accountants and auditors prior to the outbreak
of the Second World War “produced no tangible results” [1988,
p.119] and it was only the changed national mood in wartime
that encouraged the formation of the Cohen Commission lead-
ing to the legislation of 1947.
Certainly companies did continue to employ accounting
techniques that hid profits in good years and boosted them in
bad ones. Napier [1991], for example, discusses the way in
which Peninsular & Oriental Steam Navigation Company im-
proved its results between 1915 and 1931. But it was also the
case that there was willingness to use new accounting methods
where these were seen as informative and helpful. Bircher
[1998], Kitchen [1972] and Edwards [1976] identify companies
which chose to make more explicit disclosures than the law
demanded, for example at Dunlop [Edwards, 1976, p.303].
Camfferman and Zeff [2003] similarly examine the reporting
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practices of Unilever in the 1930s and 1940s. This is a case
which suggests parallels with BSA. Although Frederick Cooper
of Lever Brothers dismissed the need for consolidated balance
sheets — shareholders, he said were “not entitled to know” that
information — he made “significant steps” towards improving
the company’s reports in that period, including very detailed
reporting of segmented sales and profits [Camfferman and Zeff,
2003, pp.176-178]. Cooper’s aversion to consolidated accounts
did not preclude wider disclosure where he thought it helpful
and informative.
In the context of the accounting history of the 1930s,
Griffiths’ intervention suggests that BSA’s directors and auditors
were acting in line with certain contemporary trends. The audi-
tors, like some of their professional colleagues, were concerned
about current mandated practice but chose not to intervene
where the law did not.7 BSA was prepared to extend disclosure
in order to improve relations with shareholders and to that ex-
tent Griffiths’ aggressive criticisms bore fruit. BSA did so, it is
argued here, because they were part of a wider debate about the
need to keep shareholders informed. BSA’s directors were not
prepared to stick their necks out by making these disclosures in
the 1920s, but they did do so in advance of legislation because
they saw a chance of improving their image.
CONCLUSIONS
Personal capitalism can take a variety of forms. It is not
reducible to family capitalism and in interwar Britain ranged
from the small family firm to the relatively large holding com-
pany.8 As a generic type, however, the personal capitalist busi-
ness organization displays a strong linkage between ownership
and control, has a limited managerial hierarchy, and tends to
evolve a governance system based on the establishment of a
governing group who place a high premium on loyalty, trust and
stewardship as core social habits.9
7 They can be contrasted with, for instance, Henry Morgan of the Society of
Incorporated Accountants and Auditors, who called throughout the 1930s for
improved disclosure to increase shareholders’ confidence. There was support in
some sections of the accounting profession for change, but by no means all
accountants were swayed by it. See Maltby [2000, p.44].
8 For the activities of personal capitalist firms in different industries see
Lloyd-Jones and Lewis [2000, 2003], for the role of the holding company see
Fitzgerald [2000] and Quail [2002].
9 The notion of social habits is derived from Veblen. See Hodgson [1998, pp.
463-477]; Lloyd-Jones and Lewis [2003, pp. 230-231].
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Quail’s approach has been particularly informative in draw-
ing attention to the broader aspects of personal capitalism and
this sets the context for exploring the idiosyncratic patterns
emerging at the firm level. Certainly at BSA the evidence sug-
gests that there was only limited development of a managerial
hierarchy. This tends to confirm Quail’s view that in a proprieto-
rial firm there is “fixity of organisational structure” which
strongly embeds the personal power of directors [2000, p.2].
However, in the case of our more detailed analysis of corporate
governance at BSA, the evidence demonstrates the underlying
flexibility of a personal capitalist firm. A dominant coalition
acquired “strategic position” at the top of the company and con-
solidated personal control for over two decades. However, a sus-
tained shareholder critique created the context for major
changes in the dominant group and in the form of governance
by the early 1930s. Our case study suggests that “strategic posi-
tion” is contingent over the long term on the capability of execu-
tive management to ensure optimal performance. It followed
that the strategic positioning evolved by the triumvirate at BSA
needed to be defended, and sustained criticism led to conces-
sions and eventually to its loss of power.
The episodes explored in the paper are all instances of shifts
in power, or in the acknowledgement of power. The case of
Newton v BSA confirmed the ability of the directors to disclose
as much or as little information as they chose, within the flex-
ibility provided by company law. Some shareholders protested,
but the majority could not be mobilized to demand more infor-
mative financial reports. This was a period when small share-
holders were not likely to attempt to intervene in governance.
BSA set a legal precedent and confirmed the practice of a num-
ber of other companies. But the fact the case was brought is also
a reminder of the potential for conflict even at a high point,
historically, of directorial power. It also indicates the impor-
tance of the close link between governance and issues of ac-
countability.
The second episode, the Daimler merger of 1910 consoli-
dated director power and produced the triumvirate who re-
mained in control of the enlarged BSA group until the early
1930s. This may be seen as an exemplar of the entrenched per-
sonal capitalism of interwar British business, which has been
attacked by Chandler. That is, a small group of directors who
acquire “strategic position” and appeared impervious to share-
holder pressure and resistant to the demands for change. The
personal control of the triumvirate was embedded at BSA in the
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person of Dudley Docker whose strong connections with the
firm led him to draw the dominant group of directors into a set
of regional and national networks (during the 1920s three BSA
directors were at various times Members of Parliament, includ-
ing Rogers and Manville) that appeared to place them at the
cutting edge of progressive business opinion. But governance,
even in personal capitalist firms, cannot simply be reduced to a
monolithic group of directors, and in the case of BSA, the events
of the 1920s and early 1930s saw the erosion of the triumvirate’s
personal power as it faced sustained challenge and eventually
lost the confidence of Docker.
The third episode, exploring a set of internal and external
events affecting BSA in the 1920s and 1930s showed that direc-
tors could not persistently resist change. The pressures they en-
countered came partly from individuals with insider knowledge,
such as Walker and Griffiths, and also from the body of share-
holders who no longer behaved passively. As O’Sullivan has as-
serted, a system of corporate governance helps shape “who
makes investment decisions in corporations, what type of deci-
sion they make, and how returns from investments are distrib-
uted” [2000, p.1], and in the 1920s BSA shareholders, influenced
by dissidents such as Griffiths, were increasingly driven by dis-
appointing results to question the business competence and
strategic decisions of the triumvirate. Changes in the external
business environment also added to the pressures faced by busi-
ness leaders in firms such as BSA. For example, the Greene
Committee of 1925 was a reflection of a growing post-war move-
ment in favor of better quality accounting disclosure. The con-
juncture of internal and external pressure came to a head at
BSA in the “fiasco” of the 1931 annual meeting which led to the
breaking up of the triumvirate (by 1932 it had lost executive
control), the re-organization of the company under a new chair-
man, an improvement in the provision of disclosure, and a rec-
ognition of the need to respond more convincingly to share-
holder questions.
While the period 1900-1950 has been described as a “golden
age of directorial power” [Hannah, 1974], this study of BSA
shows that the form of governance was more fluid as a domi-
nant group of directors was forced to give way when the balance
of power was shifted by sustained shareholder criticism and
changes in the legal and business environment. The case also
illustrates the flexibility of personal capitalist firms. At BSA,
effective choices were made concerning the firm’s governance
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and the occupation of “strategic position” was not necessarily a
guarantee of directorial permanence.
REFERENCES
The Accountant, various issues.
Bircher, P. (1988), “Company Law Reform and the Board of Trade, 1929-1943,”
Accounting and Business Research, Vol. 18, No.1: 107-119.
Bircher, P. (1991), From the Companies Act of 1929 to the Companies Act of 1948:
A Study of Change in Law and Practice of Accounting (London: Garland
Publishing).
Buxton, N. K. and Aldcroft, D. H. (eds.) (1979), British Industry Between the
Wars: Instability and Industrial Development 1919-1939 (London: Scolar
Press).
Camfferman, K. and Zeff, S.A. (2003), “‘The Apotheosis of Holding Company
Accounting’: Unilever’s Financial Reporting Innovations from the 1920s to
the 1940s,” Accounting, Business and Financial History, Vol.13, No. 2: 171-
206.
Chandler, A. D. Jnr. (1990), Scale and Scope: The Dynamics of Industrial Capital-
ism (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press).
Cheffins, B. R. (2001), “History and the Global Corporate Governance Revolu-
tion: The U.K. Perspective,” Business History, Vol. 43, No. 4: 87-118.
Church, R. (1990), “The Limitations of the Personal Capitalism Paradigm,” Busi-
ness History Review, Vol. 64, No. 4: 703-710.
Church, R. (1993), “The Family Firm in Industrial Capitalism: International
Perspectives on Hypothesis and History,” Business History, Vol. 35, No. 4:
17-43.
Church, R. (1995), The Rise and Decline of the British Motor Industry (Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press).
Coventry Record Office (CRO), PA 594, Daimler Records.
Davenport-Hines, R. (1984), Dudley Docker: The Life and Times of a Trade War-
rior (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
Davenport-Hines, R. (1985), “Sir Hallewell Rogers”, in Jeremy, D. J. (ed.), Dictio-
nary of Business Biography, Vol.4 (London: Butterworth): 932-927
The Economist, various issues.
Edwards, J.R. (1976), “The Accounting Profession and Disclosure in Published
Reports, 1925-1932,” Accounting and Business Research, Vol.6, No.3: 289-
303.
Edwards, J.R. (1989), A History of Financial Accounting (London: Routledge).
Edwards, J.R. and Webb, K.M. (1984), “The Development of Group Accounting
in the United Kingdom to 1933,” Accounting Historians Journal, Vol.11,
No.1: 31-61
Fayol, H. (1949), General and Industrial Management, Trans. C. Stoors, (London:
Pitman).
Fitzgerald, R. (2000), “The Competitive and Institutional Advantages of Holding
Companies,” Journal of Industrial History, Vol.3, No. 2: 1-30.
The Financial Times, various issues.
Glynn, S. and Booth, A. (1996), Modern Britain, An Economic and Social History
(London: Routledge).
Gourvish, T. R. (1987), “British Business and the Transition to a Corporate
Economy: Entrepreneurship and Managerial Structures,” Business History,
Vol. 29 (special edition): 18-45.
34
Accounting Historians Journal, Vol. 32 [2005], Iss. 1, Art. 6
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol32/iss1/6
183Lloyd-Jones, Lewis, Matthews, and Maltby:
Control, Conflict and Concession
Hannah, L. (1974), “Takeover Bids in Britain Before 1950: An Exercise in Busi-
ness ‘Pre-history,’” Business History, Vol.16, No. 1: 65-77.
Herman, E. S. (1981), Corporate Control and Corporate Power (Cambridge: 20th
Century Fund).
Hirschman, A. O. (1970), Exit, Voice and Loyalty (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard
University Press).
Hodgson, G.M. (1998), “On the Evolution of Thorstein Veblen’s Evolutionary
Economics,” Cambridge Journal of Economics, Vol. 22: 463-477.
Hopt, K.J., Kanda, H., Roe, M. J, Wymeersch, E. and Prigge, S. (eds.) (1998),
Comparative Corporate Governance: The State of the Art and Emerging Re-
search (Oxford: Clarendon).
John, R. (1997), “Elaborations, Revisions, Dissents: A. D. Chandler Jnr’s. Visible
Hand After Twenty Years,” Business History Review, Vol. 71, No. 2: 151-200.
Johnson, L. (1990), “The Largest Manufacturing Companies of 1935”, in Daven-
port-Hines, R. P. T. (ed.), Business in the Age of Depression and War (Lon-
don: Frank Cass): 20-39.
Keasey, K., Thompson S., and Wright M. (eds.) (1997), Corporate Governance
(Oxford: Oxford University Press).
Kitchen, J. (1972), “The Accounts of British Holding Company Groups: Develop-
ment and Attitudes to Disclosure in the Early Years,” Accounting and Busi-
ness Research, Vol.2, No.1: 114-136.
Langlois, R. N. and Robertson, P. L. (1995), Firms, Markets and Economic
Change: A Dynamic Theory of Business Institutions (London: Routledge).
Law Report 2 Chancery, 1906: 378-390.
Lloyd-Jones, R. and Lewis, M. J. (1994), “Personal Capitalism and British Indus-
trial Decline: The Personally Managed Firm and Business Strategy in
Sheffield, 1880-1920,” Business History Review, Vol. 68, No. 3: 364-411.
Lloyd-Jones, R. and Lewis, M. J. (2000), Raleigh and the British Bicycle Industry:
An Economic and Business History, 1870-1960 (Aldershot: Ashgate).
Lloyd-Jones, R. and Lewis, M. J. (2003), “Business Networks, Social Habits and
the Evolution of a Regional Industrial Structure: Coventry, 1880s- 1930s,” in
Wilson, J. F. and Popp, A, (eds.), Industrial Clusters and Regional Business
Networks in England, 1750-1970 (Aldershot: Ashgate): 229-250.
Maclean, M. (1999), “Corporate Governance in France and the UK: Long Term
Perspectives on Contemporary Institutional Arrangements,” Business His-
tory, Vol. 41, No. 1: 88-116.
Maltby, J. (2000), “Was the 1947 Companies Act a Response to a National Cri-
sis?,” Accounting History, Vol. 5, No. 2: 31-60.
Marrison, A. (1996), British Business and Protection, 1903-1932 (Oxford: Oxford
University Press).
Monks, R. and Minow, N. (2001), Corporate Governance (Oxford: Blackwell).
Midland Advertiser, 29 October 1911.
Modern Record Centre (MRC), Warwick, MS 19A, BSA Records.
Napier, C. (1991), “Secret Accounting in the P&O Group in the Inter-War Years,”
Accounting, Business and Financial History, Vol. 1, No. 3: 303-333.
Nelson, R. (1996), The Sources of Economic Growth (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard
University Press).
Nixon, St. J. (n.d.), Daimler 1896-1946 (London: G. T. Foulis and Co.).
O’Sullivan, M. (2000), Contests for Corporate Control: Corporate Governance and
Economic Performance in the USA and Germany (Oxford: Oxford University
Press).
Pollard, S. (1983), The Development of the British Economy 1918-39 (London:
Edward Arnold).
35
Lloyd-Jones et al.: Control, conflict and concession: Corporate governance, accounting and accountability at Birmingham Small Arms, 1906-1933
Published by eGrove, 2005
Accounting Historians Journal, June 2005184
Quail, J. (2000), “The Proprietorial Theory of the Firm and its Consequences,”
Journal of Industrial History, Vol. 3, No. 1: 1-35.
Quail, J. (2002), “Reflections on R. Fitzgerald on Holding Companies,” Journal of
Industrial History, Vol. 5, No. 1: 1-6.
Saul, S.B. (1962), “The Motor Car Industry in Britain to 1914,” Business History,
Vol. 5, No. 1: 24-44.
Shaw, C. (1990), “The Largest Manufacturing Employers of 1907,” in Davenport-
Hines, R. P. T. (ed), Business in the Age of Depression and War (London:
Frank Cass): 1-19.
Sheikh, S. and Chatterjee, S. K. (1995), “Perspectives on Corporate Governance,”
in Sheikh, S. and Rees, E. (eds.), Corporate Governance and Corporate Con-
trol, (London: Cavendish): 1-56.
The Statist, various issues.
Supple, B. (1991), “Scale and Scope: Alfred Chandler and the Dynamics of In-
dustrial Capitalism,” Economic History Review, Vol. 44, No. 3: 500-514.
Teece, D. J. (1993), “The Dynamics of Industrial Capitalism: Perspectives on
Alfred Chandler’s Scale and Scope,” Journal of Economic Literature, Vol.31:
199-225.
The Times, various issues.
Thoms, D. and Donnelly, T. (2002), The Coventry Motor Industry: Birth to Renais-
sance (Aldershot: Ashgate).
Toms, S. and Wright, M. (2002), “Corporate Governance, Strategy and Structure
in British Business History 1950-2000,” Business History, Vol. 44, No. 3: 91-
124.
Toms, S. and Wilson, J. F. (2003), “Scale, Scope and Accountability: Towards a
New Paradigm for British Business History,” Business History, Vol. 45, No.
4: 1-23.
Tricker, R.I. (1984), Corporate Governance (London: Gower).
Wilson, J. F. (1995), British Business History, 1720-1994 (Manchester: Manches-
ter University Press).
36
Accounting Historians Journal, Vol. 32 [2005], Iss. 1, Art. 6
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol32/iss1/6
